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1 Introduction
Ontology-based natural language processing (NLP) applications interpret language
with respect to the vocabulary of a given (domain) ontology. Take the example of an
ontology-based question answering system [26] and the following input question:
“Who painted the Mona Lisa?”. A query in SPARQL that represents the semantics
of this question with respect to the DBPedia ontology [2] could look as in Figure 1.
The interpretation of linguistic input is a compositional process and requires
knowledge about how the lexical atoms – words or phrases – which occur in a given
domain are interpreted in the context of a given ontology. An important assumption
that we build on in this paper is that the meaning of a word can not be specified
universally, i.e. independently of any application or domain, but that the meaning of
a lexical entry is specified with respect to the vocabulary defined by the given ontol-
goy. We refer to this principle as “semantics by reference”. The ontology-dependent
meaning of a lexical entry (word or phrase) is captured in what we call an ontology-
lexicon.
The principle of ‘semantics by reference’ implies that the expressivity and the
granularity at which the meaning of words can be expressed is dependent on
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select ?who where {
  dbpedia:Mona_Lisa dbprop:artist ?who .
}
Who [painted] the [Mona Lisa]?
Task:
Language:
Fig. 1 Example of mapping of natural language into a task vocabulary
the meaning distinctions made in the ontology. Consequently, there might be as-
pects of the meaning of lexical entries that can simply not be represented with
respect to the semantic vocabulary of a given ontology ([6], [7]). We will give
two examples for this, a monolingual and a cross-lingual one. Consider the words
‘mosque’ and ‘synagogue’. In an ontology on urban planning, there might ex-
ist no specific concepts to represent the meaning of these words other than the
more general concept ReligiousBuilding. Thus, with respect to this ontol-
ogy, both ‘mosque’ and ‘synagogue’ will be interpreted as referring to the concept
ReligiousBuilding. Clearly, this does not capture the ‘full lexical meaning’1
of these words, but for the application and domain ontology in question the differ-
ences between a mosque and a synagogue might be irrelevant.
Let us now consider a cross-lingual example. Consider a geographic ontology
which includes the concept of a Watercourse. With respect to this ontology, the
full lexical meaning of the French words ‘rivie`re’ and ‘fleuve’ cannot be represented,
as they encompass differing aspects that are not captured in this ontology. An on-
tology in our sense can be essentially seen as an artifact that represents a particular
conceptualization of such a domain, limiting the representation of word meaning
to those distinctions that are actually relevant in the context of the given ontology
and/or domain. As such in the context of ontology-based NLP, it follows that the
meaning of words is highly specific for a given ontology and that it should be possi-
ble to make principled choices concerning the number and granularity of senses that
a word has as these senses may be said to correspond directly to explicit ontological
distinctions made in the ontology. Overall, we thus need an ontology-lexicon that
specifies how words and phrases occurring in the domain in question are interpreted
with respect to the semantic vocabulary of the given ontology.
1 By full lexical meaning we refer to the meaning that an average speaker of a language who shares
common knowledge with his/her community associates with a word in their mental lexicon with
respect to some language of thought.
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A key question is how senses in an ontology-lexicon differ from those employed
in traditional lexical resources such as WordNet. In fact, we could ask if explicit
senses are needed at all in the context of the ontology-lexicon interface where on-
tology elements (classes, relations, individuals) essentially capture the meaning of
words. We argue, however, that in the context of an ontology-lexicon, the role of a
sense is to reify the link between a lexical entry and the concept it evokes, at the
same time providing a hook into the ontology, thus allowing the larger context of
the evoked concept to be exploited for interpretation. In addition, this reified link
allows to model properties, including register as well as pragmatic constraints and
implications related to the usage of the given work as evoking the concept in ques-
tion.
Thus, we argue that in the context of the ontology-lexicon interface, a sense can
be understood as a three-faceted entity. On the one hand, a sense can be understood
as a reification of a pair of lexical entry and its corresponding reference in the on-
tology, i.e. the evoked concept so to speak. This is useful to state conditions under
which it is possible to interpret the word as referring to that concept. Secondly, a
sense can be regarded as a subset of all the uses of the given lexical entry that refer
to the concept in question. Thirdly, a sense represents also a “hypothetical” concept
that, if added to the ontology, would be a subclass of the evoked concept. This hy-
pothetical concept accounts for the full lexical meaning of the word in question, but
neither exists explicitly in the lexicon nor the ontology.2
The inclusion of explicit senses in the lexicon – as reifications of lexical en-
try/concept pairs – does not imply that the meanings of a word are fixed. In fact,
through the interplay between the ontology as background knowledge and the given
linguistic context (i.e. a specific sentence in which the word in question appears),
further aspects of the meaning of a word can be brought to the foreground by a
process that produces a semantic interpretation of the sentence. Lexical meanings
in the ontology-lexicon can therefore be generated upon need, given the constraints
of lexical context and semantic scope of the ontology. In this sense, an ontology
thus supports a generative process in the sense of Wierzbicka [27] and Pustejovsky
[25] by which further aspects of the meaning of a word can be derived from the
ontology. Yet, these additional meaning aspects need not form part of the semantics
of the word in the narrow sense, but are part of the larger ontological context and
can be ‘recruited’ to support the interpretation of the word or phrase in a particu-
lar sentence. In line with this, our analysis allows us to provide a new account of
the phenomenon of polysemy and metonymy in the context of the ontology-lexicon
interface.
In this chapter, we will elaborate on these issues, providing a theoretical account
of the role of senses in the ontology-lexicon interface. We will further analyse how
aspects of the interpretation of words that have been traditionally subsumed under
the phenomenon of polysemy. We argue that such aspects can be accounted for by
a process that brings into the foreground further aspects of the meaning of words
2 As our reviewer has pointed out, the hypothetical concept thus needs to exist in some ontology.
In fact, it does, but not in the actual domain ontology, but rather in our ontology of the lexicon-
ontology interface.
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as a byproduct of the interpretation of a sentence given a specific linguistic context
and the ontology as background knowledge. We will also briefly discuss the lemon
model for representing an ontology-lexicon ([11], [22], [21]) and how the above
theoretical considerations have influenced the design of this model.
2 Senses: universal or context-specific?
Traditionally, senses are regarded as specifying the various meanings of a word.
Approaches differ essentially in whether they assume a finite and fixed amount of
senses or postulate an open and highly context-specific set of senses. The specifi-
cation of the set of senses (interpretations, meanings) for a given lexical entry is
a central task in lexicography, involving decisions on whether to ‘lump’ potential
senses together or to ‘split’ them into individual senses [15]. In practice this ends up
being a very subjective task, in which lexicographers are guided by factors such as
the purpose of the lexicographic resource, its envisioned users, the frequency of use
of a certain meaning, or its predictability from other senses [19] and as such it has
been questioned whether this is useful for NLP applications [17]. This view seems to
be validated by the task of Word Sense Disambiguation (WSD) where it seems that
many sense distinctions are not natural even for humans, as inter-annotator agree-
ment for WSD seems to have a limit of about 80% [13]. A traditional approach to
defining senses is by cross-lingual comparison [12]. The distinction between ‘pa-
per’ (as a material) vs. a (news)-paper (as an information container) is for example
inherent in many languages3 and one could thus argue that these two senses are
language-independent or ‘natural’ (if not to say universal). Furthermore, it has been
shown in the context of machine translation that this approach is helpful [8] and
outperforms approaches based on fixed catalogues of senses such as found in Word-
Net. However, cross-lingual differences are not a solid basis to identify different
word senses. Take the example of ‘computer’ with its two senses ‘a machine for
performing calculations automatically’ and ‘an expert at calculation (or at operating
calculating machines)’4. By cross-lingual comparison, we might identify these two
different senses if in some language two different words are available for each of
these two senses. If we compare German and English, however, we will find out
that both languages use the same word for these two senses, i.e. computer in En-
glish and Rechner in German. Furthermore, it is often the case that languages make
distinctions that are not considered fundamental to the native speaker of a language.
German distinguishes for instance different types of ‘going’, using ‘gehen’ in the
case of moving under one’s own power and ‘fahren’ when using mechanical assis-
tance (e.g. a bicycle). This distinction seems unnatural to a native English speaker5.
Following the tradition of linguistic relativism, it has been argued that concepts are
3 e.g., German “Papier” and “Zeitung”, French “papier” and “journal” and Japanese “kami” and
“shimbun”
4 These are the glosses of the two corresponding senses from WordNet 3.1.
5 At least from the opinion of the native English-speaking author of this paper
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language-specific, counterfeiting the assumption that cross-linguistic comparison
can help us to establish a universal set of senses. It thus seems that relying on cross-
lingual commonalities and differences as a basis to build a catalogue of senses will
lead to extreme fragmentation and to overly specific senses that are not relevant in
the context of a given application.
It has been indeed argued by some researchers that a small set of senses per word
might suffice for practical applications. Ide and Wilks [18] for instance propose that
the meaning of ‘paper’ can be captured with only three senses: i) as a material, ii) as
a written article or document and iii) as a newspaper. They argue that other senses
such as ‘publisher of the newspaper’ identified in some dictionaries are unnecessary
and can in fact be derived from background knowledge (see Section 4 on this). While
distinguishing such core senses of a word might be enough for general purposes, for
certain domains we might need a much more fine-granular and domain-specific set
of senses. Leon Arau´z et al. [20] have for example argued that in their application,
they need to distinguish three different senses of “accretion”, as i) accretion of snow
flakes in the atmosphere, ii) the accretion of ground in a tectonic plate and iii) the
accretion of sand in the formation of coastal bars. While these three senses have
a similar basic meaning, that of accumulation of materials, it is necessary in this
domain to distinguish them. However, such fine-grained distinctions will certainly
not be included in a domain-independent lexicon such as WordNet, for reasons that
should be clear.
At the other extreme are approaches that claim that any approach postulating a
finite set of senses is unsatisfactory from a theoretical point of view. This view is
connected to the assumption that there are as many senses as there are different con-
texts in which a specific word is used and is rooted in and supported by insights from
philosophy and linguistic study. Wittgenstein famously claims that “for a large class
of cases - though not for all - ... the meaning of a word is its use in the language”
[29]. Cruse states that the meaning of a word form is different in every distinct con-
text in which it occurs [9]. Later on, Cruse and Croft even maintain that word senses
are created at the moment of use, in what they consider a dynamic approach [10].
While theoretically appealing, approaches which assume an infinite inventory of
senses – one for each usage context – are less useful from an NLP point of view
as automatic processing requires an inventory of senses that generalizes beyond
specific examples and contexts observed. From an NLP perspective it is crucial to
have i) either a finite set of senses, or ii) a specification of the core meaning of a
word together with a set of generative processes that allow to derive new mean-
ings from this core. The latter is essentially the underlying idea of the Generative
Lexicon of Pustejovsky [25]. According to Pustejovsky, lexical items have a seman-
tic representation of their conventionally assumed meaning, which is accessed in
language understanding and production and can produce context-specific interpre-
tations (senses) due to certain constraints that activate one sense or the other. An
essential aspect of this theory is that lexical meaning is not decomposed into in-
dividual senses, but instead that different context-specific interpretations (roughly
corresponding to senses) are activated on demand out of an underspecified lexical
semantic representation that Pustejovsky refers to as Qualia Structure.
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Our standpoint is that there is no universal set of senses for a word that will
suit all purposes and applications. In some applications, it might suffice to interpret
both ‘synagogue’ and ‘mosque’ as ReligiousBuilding. Other domains might
require very specific senses as in the case of ‘accretion’ discussed above. In other
domains, some of the senses that are generally distinguished might not be relevant.
For instance, in the domain of scientific publishing, the material sense of ‘paper’
might not be relevant. Overall, it is thus clear that there is no set of universal senses
that are valid independently of the domain and application. It is thus legitimate to
assume that the senses of a word are specified with respect to a given ontology that
models the domain in question. The meanings of a word are thus ontology-specific
and need to be specified in an ontology-lexicon for the given ontology.
3 Senses in the Ontology-Lexicon Interface
As stated in the introduction, we regard a sense as a three-faceted entity with three
roles. We elaborate on these roles in this section. In the following, we will assume
that there is a given ontology O = (ΛO,VO) expressed in logical language ΛO and
vocabulary VO consisting of a set of concepts CO, a set of relations RO and a set of
individuals IO as well as a lexicon L.
In this paper we focus on tasks where natural language needs to be interpreted
with respect to a given task and ontology such as the question answering task as
illustrated in Figure 1. Thus, we consider that for a given task we need to find a
mapping to an ontology-based representation, which we consider to be a formula in
some task language T which uses the symbols of the vocabulary and the language
of the ontology as well as some additional task-specific symbols. The interpreta-
tion of natural language with respect to task language T is given by the following
function [·]T 6:
[·]T :L →T
where L is the natural language in question (for the purposes of this definition
we assume all words of relevance to the task are contained in the lexicon, and as
such that the sentence can be considered as a sequence of lexical entries).
3.1 Senses as reification
We denote a sense as σ (l,c), where l ∈ L is a lexical entry and c ∈VO is the ontolog-
ical concept, or reference and we define the ontologically interpretable words in the
sentence λ as Wλ ⊆{li : l is the ith word of λ}. Furthermore, we define the meaning
of a word in sentence λ as a function
6 Without loss of generality we simplify to the case where there is only a single result for the task
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[·]λT : Wλ →VO
And we assume that this function satisfies the compositionality principle given as:
∀li ∈Wλ : [li]λT = c⇒ c ∈ [λ ]T
This means that if the lexical entry li is interpreted as c in sentence λ , then c should
be part of the interpretation of λ with respect to task T .
Finally, we can define a sense, σ (l,c) to be valid with respect to a meaning func-
tion if the following holds:
∃i ∈ N,λ ∈L : li ∈Wλ ∧ [li]λT = c
With this definition, we consider the sense to be a reified pair capturing the cases
under which it is valid to interpret l as having meaning c, where we understand
validity to mean that the sense is used in at least one interpretation for the given
task.
Consider the question in our introduction: Who painted the Mona Lisa? In this case:
λ = Who painted the Mona Lisa and:
[painted]λT = dbprop:artist
[Mona Lisa]λT = dbpedia:Mona Lisa
Hence we have the following valid senses for our example sentence:
σpaint,dbprop:artist
σMona Lisa,dbpedia:Mona Lisa
In this role, we can understand a sense as the ‘glue’ between a pair of lexical
entry and ontology concept, and also as the container for those pragmatic features
(usage, register, etc.) whose role is neither purely ontological nor lexical.
3.2 Sense as subset of uses
As we have already argued above, the semantic distinctions made in the ontology
provide a principled basis for defining a partition of the uses of a certain lexical
entry. We define U – the usage set of a lexical entry l – as
U(l) = {(li,λ ) : li ∈Wλ ,λ ∈L }
For each sense σ (l,c) we assume that the usage set ucl is defined as:
ucl = {(li,λ ) : li ∈Wλ ,λ ∈L , [li]λT = c}
For a set of senses Σ , we denote by Σ |l all senses whose lexical entry is l and we
say that a set of senses is complete for a lexical entry l if its usage sets for a task T
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satisfy:
U(l) =
⋃
σ (l,c)∈Σ |l
ucl
The existence of a sense linking the lexical entry l and the concept c implies that
the lexical entry can be used with this meaning, which is supported by at least one
interpretation in the context of the given task. It then follows that a complete set of
senses for a lexical entry constitutes a (non-disjoint) partition of all the uses (U(l)).
One facet of a sense is that it can be specified as a subset of uses. By specifying
which ontological distinctions are relevant in a given domain, the ontology thus
provides a principled criterion to define the senses or meanings of a lexical entry in
relation to the given ontology. Thus, the sense represents a subset of the uses of the
lexical entry l for which l can be understood as meaning concept c.
3.3 Sense as a subconcept
The sense can be also understood as an implicit concept that captures further aspects
of the meaning of the lexical entry that can not be captured by the ontology. In the
following, we try to formalize this idea, borrowing several notions from Guarino
[14], including the notion of a conceptualization and an ontological commitment.
Definition: A conceptualization is a triple D = (D,W,R) with D a universe of
discourse, W a set of possible worlds and R a set of conceptual relations on the
domain space 〈D,W 〉, where a conceptual relation ρ on 〈D,W 〉 is a function ρ :
W → D∗ from the set W into D∗, the set of all n-ary (extensional) relations on D.
We define the lexical extension of a lexical entry l as a mapping from worlds to
its extension, i.e.
lex(l) : W → D∗
We now consider an ontology O = (ΛO,VO) where the vocabulary can be further
divided into VO = {IO ∪CO ∪ RO} consisting of a set of individuals IO, a set of
concepts CO and a set of relations RO. In line with Guarino we also consider an
ontological commitment K for an ontology O and conceptualization D = (D,W,R)
as a pair K = (O, I) where I is a function I : V → D∪R, i.e. I is an interpretation
function that interprets the vocabulary of the ontology with respect to the vocabulary
of the conceptualization.
We shall now assume that c ∈CO and for each sense σ (l,c) define its ontological
projection as follows:
pi lc = lex(l)∩ I(c)
Here, lex(l) and I(c) are functions from possible worlds to D∗7. From this it
follows that:
7 We denote the intersection of two functions f and g here as ( f ∩g)(w) = f (w)∩g(w)
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∀w : pi lc(w)⊆ I(c)(w)
If we then add to our ontology a concept cpi lc and extend the ontological commit-
ment such that:
I(cpi lc) = pi
l
c
then we get that:
O |=M ∀x (cpi lc(x)⇒ c(x))
where M is an intended model in the sense of Guarino [14]. For the intended
models of the ontology, it follows that cpi lc is thus a subclass of c, which we represent
as cpi lc v c following the description logics notation. This result is similar for the case
that c ∈ RO, in that we derive a similar cpi lc that is a sub-property of c and for c ∈ IO
we obtain that cpi lc = c (as there is no sub-division of an individual, naturally). These
projected or hypothetical concepts cpi lc thus represent the full lexical meaning of
entry l when interpreted as concept c.
3.4 The three facets
As such, we have defined the sense in terms of three closely related entities or roles:
1. σ (l,c): The pair representing a correspondence between a lexical entry and vo-
cabulary item in the ontology that it can be interpreted as in a given task.
2. ucl : The set of uses of a particular lexical entry l when used as referring to c.
3. pi lc: a hypothetical concept representing the full lexical meaning of l when inter-
preted as c.
4 Systematic polysemy in the ontology-lexicon interface
In the previous sections we have argued that there is no universal set of senses for
a word, but that the meanings of a word are specific for a given task and domain as
described by a given ontology. We think that this is compatible with the view of Ide
and Wilks [18] who propose using a small set of senses that suit a given task. Ide
and Wilks for example propose to use three senses for ‘paper’: i) material, ii) daily
newspaper and iii) article, thus excluding the sense of ‘publisher of a newspaper’.
However, this raises the question how we would interpret the following sentence:
The paper was sued by the Workers Revolutionary Party.
A reasonable interpretation for this sentence might look as follows:
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∃x sued(WorkersRevolutionaryParty′,x)∧NewspaperPublisher(x)
Now, if paper does not have the sense of NewspaperPublisher, where does
then the part of the above formula – NewspaperPublisher(x) come from? The
meaning of paper in the above sentence might be derived as a result of a generative
process which brings to the foreground the knowledge that a newspaper always has
a publisher which publishes it, thus yielding the following meaning:
∃x ∃y sued(WorkersRevolutionaryParty′,y)∧Newspaper(x)∧ publisher(x,y)
The meaning of paper in the above sentence can thus be approximated by
λy ∃x Newspaper(x)∧ publisher(x,y). Now where does this meaning come from?
Following Hobbs et al. [16] we understand that this can be obtained by a princi-
ple of abduction in that we can introduce the property publisher as we have
axioms within the ontology which state that the range of the sued property must
be the of a type IndividualOrOrganization, which is a disjoint class with
Newspaper. Furthermore, we suppose that the property publisher has domain
and range of Publication and Organization which are super/sub classes of
Newspaper and IndividualOrOrganization respectively. Hence, from an
ontological point of view, the above interpretation is thus plausible and can thus be
deduced abductively by a system performing the interpretation task.
In the linguistics literature, different examples of such a systematic relation be-
tween different meanings of a word has been studied under the label of systematic
polysemy. Examples of classes of words the senses of which are systematically re-
lated are the following (see [1] or [24])8:
• animal/meat (The lamb is running in the field vs. John had lamb for dinner)
• plant/food (Mary watered the fig in the garden vs. Mary ate a fig)
• producer/product (The newspaper fired its editor vs. John spilled coffee over the
newspaper)
• institution/building (The university became established in the early medieval
ages. vs. The university is close to the capitol)
As an example of the institution/building class, consider the following uses of
‘school’ based on [4]:
• “Daddy drove me to school this morning”.⇒ Daddy drove me to the location of
the school building this morning.
• “They painted the school over the holidays” ⇒ They painted the walls of the
building which hosts the school.
• “The school was built in 1950.”⇒ The building which hosts the school (as insti-
tution) was built in 1950.
• “The school decided to fire the teacher.”⇒ The executive board of the school (as
institution) decided to fire the teacher.
8 Buitelaar [5] gives an overview of many systematic polysemy classes derived from WordNet 1.6
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“school“ School
Executive
Board Building Wall
Location
Director
Address
ref located_at
hosted_inhas_board
has_director
has_part
has_address
definition
Fig. 2 Concept of ‘school’ in the ontology
Logically, the meanings of the above sentences can be expressed as follows9:
• “Daddy drove me to school this morning”: ∃x, l,s drive(daddy,x, l)∧speaker(x)∧
location(l)∧ located at(s, l)∧ educational institution(s)
• “They painted the school over the holidays”: ∃p,b,s paint(they, p)∧has part(b, p)∧
building(b)∧hosted in(s,b)∧ educational institution(s)
• “The school was built in 1950.”: ∃s,e,b built(e,b)∧happensAt(e, t)∧year(t,1950)∧
building(b)∧hosted in(s,b)∧ educational institution(s).
• “The school decided to fire the teacher.”: ∃b, t,s f ire(b, t)∧teacher(t)∧has board(s,b)∧
educational institution(s)
The above paraphrases suggest that there are (at least) the following different
senses of school: i) address where the school building is located, ii) building which
hosts the school as institution, iii) walls of the building in which the school (as
institution) is located, iv) executive board of the school (as institution). Thus, the
meanings of ‘school’ in the above sentences could be formalized as follows:
1. λ l location(l)∧ locatedAt(s, l)∧ educational institution(s)
2. λ p has part(b, p)∧building(b)∧hosted in(s,b)∧ educational institution(s)
3. λb building(b)∧hosted in(s,b)∧ educational institution(s)
4. λb has board(s,b)∧ educational institution(s)
Now, would we include all of the above senses in a lexicon? Definitely not, for
good reasons. In fact, it seems that all of the above mentioned meanings are related
in the ontology to the concept educational institution and can thus be generated
when interpreting the corresponding sentences by some process of abduction that
9 For the sake of simplicity, we do not represent the temporal adverbials and we model definites
through existential quantifiers.
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exploits the ontological neighbourhood of educational institution to bring to the
foreground additional – systematically related – meaning aspects as required by the
linguistic context.
In fact, we argue that educational institution is the primary meaning of ‘school’
and that the different linguistic contexts above select one particular or related aspect
of the primary meaning of school, emphasizing the building in which it is located,
the executive board, the activities that are typically offered at school, etc. If all of the
aspects that are relevant for a school are modelled within an ontology (as sketched in
Figure 2), most of the above systematically related concepts can be derived through
appropriate coercion operations that traverse the ontology to find an entity that is
related and that fits the linguistic and semantic context of the sentence in question.
Such a viewpoint is still in agreement with our definition of sense given in sec-
tion 3 as it follows that the senses are still complete as although not every usage of a
word is directly interpreted as educational institution, every interpretation uses the
symbol educational institution and as such this sense is complete for the examples
above. It is in this way that we argue that systematic polysemy is not a phenomenon
that needs to be modeled in the context of the ontology-lexicon interface but exclu-
sively at the ontological level.10
As such, from the perspective of the lexicon-ontology interface, the role of a
sense is essentially to provide a hook into the ontology graph, reifying the fact that
a word evokes a certain concept in the ontology. In our case, we merely need a link
between the word ‘school’ and the concept educational institution.
Thus, from the point of view of ontologies we can thus distinguish two types of
lexical ambiguities:
• Systematic Polysemy: This case corresponds to the case where a word has dif-
ferent meanings that are systematically related through an ontology. In this case,
the different interpretations of the lexical entry can be obtained by a process of
abduction based on the axioms present in the ontology.
• Homonymy: According to our understanding, homonymy refers to the case
where the different meanings of a word are not related through axioms in the
ontology, so that two different senses are indeed required.
A consequence, however, is that whether a lexical ambiguity is systematic or ir-
regular depends ultimately on the specific ontology. From a NLP perspective, we
think that this represents indeed a principled approach, reducing the number of
senses of a word to a minimum while being able to generate systematically related
meanings exploiting background knowledge.
On the Role of Senses in the Ontology-Lexicon 13
Lexical
 Entry
LexicalSense
context:Resource
definition:Resource
condition:Resource
sense isSenseOf
reference isReferenceOf
propertyDomain
propertyRange
Ontology
senseRelation equivalent
broader
narrower
incompatible
Fig. 3 The modelling of senses within the lemon ontology-lexicon model.
5 Application of senses in the ontology-lexicon model lemon
In earlier work [22], we have proposed lemon as a model for representing and
sharing ontology lexica using Semantic Web standards such as OWL and RDF.
In lemon, senses as considered in this paper are implemented through the class
LexicalSense, which reifies the link between a LexicalEntry and some
entity in the ontology (see Figure 3). This link is established via two properties
(reference and sense) which are specified as functional properties, such that it
can be inferred that the sense is unique to the pair (l,c) as in the definition.11
As a simple example of the representation of senses in lemon we consider the
case of translation. In most cases, a certain lexical entry l1 is not a translation of
some other lexical entry l2 in all contexts. Rather, the “translation property” is de-
pendent on the meaning of lexical entry l1. Thus, it might be that l2 is only a trans-
lation of l1 when l1 is interpreted as concept c. Translation is thus a multi-valued
function trans : LO×VO →P(LO×VO), i.e. defined on pairs of lexical entry and
concept. For example, the German word ‘Krebs’ is translated into English as ‘can-
cer’ when referring to the illness and as ‘crab’ when referring to the animal. In this
example, it holds that (cancer,illness) ∈ trans((Krebs,illness)) but (crab,illness) 6∈
trans((Krebs,illness)). Instead, it holds that (cancer,illness) ∈ trans((Krebs,illness)).
10 Of course, we admit that for a certain application, specifying some of the senses that are derived
from the primary one may improve performance.
11 Technically, as we follow an open world assumption, if a sense is stated as reference to on-
tology entities or lexical entries, these entities or entries are considered to be exactly equivalent
(pseudonymous)
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The property of being a translation is thus a property between senses and not be-
tween lexical entries. This is formally stated in lemon as follows:
:Krebs lemon:sense [ lemon:reference dbpedia:Cancer ] ;
lemon:sense [ lemon:reference dbpedia:Crab ] .
:Cancer lemon:sense [ lemon:reference dbpedia:Cancer ] .
:Cangrejo lemon:sense [ lemon:reference dbpedia:Crab ] .
As a sense is a reified pair of the lexical entry and ontology concept, we do
not require an explicit translation link to capture the trans function defined above
(although the schema does not preclude the inclusion of such a link if desired).
5.1 Sense properties
lemon allows additional properties to be attached to sense objects that can be used
to describe aspects related to the usage of this lexical entry. In this sense, the reifica-
tion of sense is crucial to express i) certain pragmatic implications of using a certain
lexical entry to refer to the concept in question and ii) to state conditions under
which it is legitimate to interpret the word as referring to the concept. An example
of this might be the subjective or emotional associations that a certain language and
culture makes when using a certain lexical entry to refer to a concept, i.e., conno-
tations. Consider the noun ‘retardation’, which was earlier used to refer to people
with learning and developmental difficulties. However, this use is considered ex-
tremely pejorative in modern usage12. However, according to the current, 4th Edi-
tion of ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ (DSM-IV)13, there
is a pathology called “Mental Retardation.” The senses that we might distinguish
for ‘retardation’ are the following ones:
• A meaning of developmentally disabled that is used primarily in texts before
1970s.
• A meaning of unintelligent that is pejorative
• A reference to DSM-IV disorders 317, 318 or 319.
The associated aspects of the usage of the word ‘retardation’ can neither be at-
tached to the lexical entry itself nor the corresponding classes in an ontology as they
describe the pair of lexical entry and concept and in particular constrain i) in which
cases and under which conditions the lexical entry can refer to the concept in ques-
tion, but also ii) what connotations the use of this lexical entry has when referring
to the concept. In the case of ‘retardation’ as ‘developmentally disabled’ we would
12 As a corollary many charities have changed their original name, for example the “Association
for the Help of Retarded Children” is now just the “AHRC”, which officially is not an intialism.
13 Standard international reference for mental health disorders
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attach to the pair the information that this interpretation was mainly valid before the
1970s; this is neither a property of the lexical entry itself nor of the actual concept
DevelopmentallyDisabled. With respect to the fact that ‘retardation’ is con-
sidered offensive in some contexts, this is neither a property of the lexical entry, as
the word can be used in a non-offensive manner, nor of the actual concept, as the
concept can be expressed in a non-offensive manner, but of the lexical entry when
referring to the concept. A reification of the pair of lexical entry and concept is thus
needed to express the pragmatic connotations that the word has when interpreted as
a certain concept. We model this in lemon as follows:
:Retardation_entry
lemon:sense [
lemon:reference dbpedia:Developmental_Disorder ;
lexinfo:dating lexinfo:old
] ;
lemon:sense [
lemon:reference dbpedia:Stupidity ;
lexinfo:register lexinfo:perjorative
] ;
lemon:sense [
lemon:reference dsmiv:317
] .
As can be seen the lemon model requires an explicit sense object in its graph as
otherwise there would be no sensible place to attach the properties required.
5.2 Contexts and conditions
In order to specify contextual conditions and constraints under which it is legitimate
to interpret a lexical entry as referring to a given concept, lemon allows to model
such contextual conditions using two properties: context and condition. The
property context constraints the domains under which the interpretation of the
lexical entry as the concept in question is permissible. For example, for the case of
‘retardation’ discussed above, the interpretation as referring to a disorder from the
DSM-IV is valid in the medical domain. Two further properties called dating and
register are subproperties of context and allow to constrain the time (e.g.
before 1970) or register (e.g. informal, colloquial, ...) as conditions under which the
lexical entry can be interpreted as referring to the concept in question.
The second property condition is used to state an evaluable expression de-
scribing the circumstances that need to be fulffilled such that the lexical entry can be
interpreted as the ontological concept in question. The property is abstract and spe-
cific properties instantiating it need to be defined. The lemon model has two built-in
subproperties of condition: propertyDomain and propertyRange. They
restrict the usage of the lexical entry, requiring that the domain or range of the on-
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tological property is of a specify type. For example, we could model that the verb
‘essen’, when interpreted as eat, requires the eater to be human, while ‘fressen’,
when interpreted as eat, requires the eater to be an animal.14
The semantics of ‘fressen’ and ’essen’ are thus modelled in lemon as follows:
:essen a lemon:LexicalEntry;
lemon:canonicalForm [ lemon:writtenRep "essen"@de];
lemon:synBehaviour [ a lexinfo:TransitiveFrame;
lemon:subject :essen_subj;
lemon:object :essen_obj];
isocat:partOfSpeech lexinfo:Verb;
lemon:sense [ lemon:reference myOntology:eat;
lemon:subjOfProp :essen_subj;
lemon:objOfProp :essen_obj;
lemon:propertyDomain myOntology:Human].
:fressen a lemon:LexicalEntry;
lemon:canonicalForm [ lemon:writtenRep "fressen"@de];
lemon:synBehaviour [ a lexinfo:TransitiveFrame;
lemon:subject :fressen_subj;
lemon:object :fressen_obj];
isocat:partOfSpeech lexinfo:Verb;
lemon:sense [ lemon:reference myOntology:eat;
lemon:subjOfProp :essen_subj;
lemon:objOfProp :essen_obj;
lemon:propertyDomain myOntology:Animal].
While lemon provides these two built-in properties, many other properties that
model contextual conditions are possible. However, these need to be introduced by
taking into account specific tasks and have thus not been included in the general
model.
5.3 Sense relations
lemon also has properties for the representation of relationships between senses that
are defined based on the facets as defined above. In particular the properties are
defined as follows based on the usages ucl and the projection pi
l
c.
• equivalent: The usages of the two senses are equal and the projections are
equal.
• broader: The usages of the first sense is a superset of the second sense’s usage
and projections are similarly a superset.
• narrower: The usages of the first sense is a subset of the second sense’s usage
and projections are similarly a subset.
14 lemon actually allows to model the corresponding (subcategorization) frames of these verbs and
their mapping to ontological properties. This aspect of the model is however not discussed in the
present paper. The interested reader is referred to the lemon cookbook [21].
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• incompatible: The usages of the two senses are disjoint and the projections
are disjoint.
These properties have a very different status compared to the properties in the
ontology. The properties in the ontology are defined between concepts, while the
properties considered here are defined between senses as three-faceted entities in-
troduced in this paper. These sense relations thus model (lexical) meaning aspects
that are not included in the ontology but might nevertheless be important to model
for a number of reasons. For example, one might be able to establish relations be-
tween different ontologies with different conceptualizations at the sense level if
they are difficult to align at the conceptual level (e.g. because they vary substan-
tially in granularity and modelling detail). Consider the property of antonymy for
instance. Antonymy is typically a property between words that is not to be confused
with the disjointness property between concepts used in many ontology languages.
lemon introduces the property antonymy at the sense level as a subproperty of
incompatible. The only ontological consequence is that the two projections pi lc
of the senses are regarded as being (ontologically) disjoint.
We can also use the lemon properties to capture the relationships between par-
ticular interpretations of lexical entries. For example, we consider the example of
the French words ‘rivie`re’ and ‘fleuve’, which may be mapped to an ontology that
only contains a concept corresponding to the English word ‘river’, while still en-
suring that the terms are considered as not interchangeable. This can be achieved in
lemon by mapping both words to the same ontology class but indicating that they
are incompatible
:Riviere lemon:sense :Riviere_sense .
:Riviere_sense lemon:reference dbpedia:River .
:Fleuve lemon:sense :Fleuve_sense .
:Fleuve_sense lemon:reference dbpedia:River .
:Riviere_sense lemon:incomptable :Fleuve_sense .
:Fleuve_sense lemon:incomptable :Riviere_sense .
While sense relations described above do strictly speaking affect neither the ac-
tual ontology nor its conceptualization, they are crucial for NLP applications. Take
the example of natural language generation and assume that we want to describe a
given river in French. We might choose to generate the lexicalization ‘rivie`re’,
but then we should remain consistent and not refer to the same river as ‘fleuve’. A
NLP system thus needs to know that both senses are incompatible.
From a more general perspective, sense relations allow to represent cultural and
linguistic differences in terminology and meaning granularity to be encoded in the
lexicon.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have revisited the notion of sense in the context of the ontology-
lexicon interface and argued that the senses that a word has are specific to a task and
domain as modelled by a given ontology. Following a principle we call semantics
by reference, the goal of an ontology lexicon is to define the meaning of a lexical
entry relative to the meaning distinctions made in a given ontology. We have argued
that in the context of the ontology-lexicon interface, the intrinsic subjectiveness of
the answer to the question of which and how many senses a certain word has, can
be overcome in a principled way by resorting to the meaning distinctions in the
ontology. We have then discussed whether, under this assumption, senses are still
meaningful entities in the context of the ontology-lexicon interface. We argue that
the notion of sense is necessary in the context of ontology-lexicon interface and
that in this context senses can be understood as a three-faceted entity that has the
following roles: firstly, a sense can be understood as a reification of a pair of lexical
entry and its corresponding reference in the ontology (concept). This is useful to
state conditions under which it is permissible to interpret the word as referring to
that concept. Second, the senses represent a set of disambiguated uses of an entry
when used as referring to a certain concept in a given interpretation task. Third
and finally, a sense represents also a “hypothetical” concept that, if added to the
ontology, would be a subclass of the reference. We have further discussed what
implications this has for the traditional notion of systematic polysemy, arguing that
this is a phenomenon that should be resolved by means of abduction on the axioms
in the ontology instead of by recording them in the lexicon. From this perspective,
the role of a sense is to provide a hook to a concept in the ontology, providing an
access route to other (systematically related) aspects of the meaning of a word. This
hook can the be exploited in the process of interpretation of a sentence in order to
bring additional meaning aspects into the foreground as required by the linguistic
context and to yield a well-defined interpretation. Finally, we have provided formal
definitions of what it means for a sense to exist in the ontology-lexicon as well as
details of how this understanding is implemented in the ontology-lexicon model
lemon.
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